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transmission	system	operators	 (TSOs)	determined	market	areas	 in	 the	European	Union,	but	driven	
by	 the	 prospect	 of	 higher	 liquidity	 in	 the	 wholesale	 market,	 welfare	 gains	 for	 society	 as	 well	 as	
completion	of	 the	 internal	energy	market,	market	areas	have	been	merged.	Such	market	mergers,	
however,	may	also	lead	to	competition	amongst	TSOs,	as	network	users	gain	the	possibility	to	book	
interchangeable	 capacity	 at	 different	 TSOs	 within	 one	 market	 area.	 A	 necessary	 condition	 for	























create	 a	 European	 internal	 gas	 market	 (European	 Union,	 2012).	 To	 achieve	 this	 aim,	 EU	 policy	
measures	directly	 influence	national	energy	policies,	 regulatory	 frameworks,	and	the	design	of	gas	
markets	in	Member	States.	In	the	past,	this	occurred	especially	through	the	three	so-called	European	
Energy	 Packages	 entering	 into	 force	 in	 1998,	 2003	 and	 2009,	 respectively.	 These	 implied	 the	
liberalisation	of	the	EU	gas	markets	and	the	establishment	of	wholesale	markets.	 In	order	to	allow	
for	 these	 developments,	 a	 regulation	 to	 ensure	 non-discriminatory	 network	 access	 and	 network	
tariffs,	as	well	as	unbundling	rules	has	been	imposed	on	network	infrastructure	companies	operating	
the	essential	facilities	as	a	natural	monopoly.	In	particular,	transmission	system	operators	(hereafter:	




In	 the	past,	 it	was	necessary	 for	 suppliers	 to	book	network	 capacities	according	 to	 the	actual	
transport	route	in	order	to	supply	a	customer.	This	changed	by	introducing	entry-exit	systems,	which	
decoupled	the	physical	network	and	the	commercial	trades.	As	result	of	this	change,	network	users	
were	now	able	 to	 inject	gas	at	any	entry	point	and	withdraw	 it	at	any	exit	point	of	 such	a	market	
area	 whereas	 the	 TSO	 was	 solely	 responsible	 for	 the	 management	 of	 physical	 gas	 flows.	 This	
decoupling	also	allowed	wholesale	markets	to	arise,	as	the	injection	and	withdrawal	of	gas	became	
independent	of	 each	other	 (CEER,	2011;	 Lohmann,	2009).	Although	 the	markets	 could	evolve,	 the	
development	of	the	wholesale	markets	was	deemed	insufficient	(Frontier	Economics	Ltd.,	2014).	A	




have	 taken	place	mainly	 in	Germany,	which	consisted	of	41	market	areas	 in	2006	and	which	were	
eventually	merged	 to	 two	 today	 (Monopolkommission,	 2009;	 Ströbele	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 According	 to	
regulatory	 authorities,	 most	 European	markets	 are	 still	 not	 sufficiently	 developed,	 and	 there	 are	
doubts	 that	 this	 will	 happen	 without	 structural	 reforms	 (ACER	 and	 CEER,	 2015).	 Hence,	 further	
market	mergers,	even	cross-border,	are	to	be	expected.	
The	 integration	of	gas	markets	 is	widely	discussed	 in	 the	 literature.	 For	example,	Asche	et	al.	
(2013)	 found	 a	 high	 integration	 of	 the	 gas	 markets	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 Belgium.	
Petrovich	(2013)	measured	the	degree	of	market	integration	for	different	EU	gas	wholesale	markets	
using	the	wholesale	prices.	Kuper	and	Mulder	(2016)	focused	on	the	integration	of	the	German	and	
Dutch	 gas	market	 not	 only	 based	 on	wholesale	 prices	 but	 also	 taking	 into	 account	 infrastructure	
utilisation	and	regulatory	changes,	including	mergers	of	markets.		
Market	mergers,	however,	do	not	only	have	an	 impact	on	wholesale	markets.	Networks	users	
also	 obtain	 transport	 alternatives	 via	 mergers.	 Merging	 two	 markets	 areas,	 which	 are	 entry-exit	
systems,	 results	 in	a	new	 joint	market	area,	also	organised	as	an	entry-exit	 system.	Therefore,	gas	
injected	 into	 the	 network	 of	 one	 TSO	 may	 be	 withdrawn	 from	 the	 network	 of	 the	 other	 TSO	




import	 to	 or	 export	 gas	 from	 the	 merged	 market.	 Since	 network	 users	 obtain	 a	 choice	 amongst	
routes	and	TSOs,	market	mergers	may	imply	competition	among	TSOs.		
In	 the	 literature,	 TSOs	 are	 generally	 considered	 as	 natural	 monopolies,	 which	 need	 to	 be	
regulated	 in	 absence	 of	 effective	 competition	 (Sherman,	 2001).	 In	 U.S.	 gas	 markets,	 competition	
between	pipelines	 referred	to	vertically	 integrated	companies,	where	the	pipelines	used	to	be	not	
only	 an	 asset	 for	 transportation,	 but	 also	 the	 single	 suppliers	 of	 gas	 to	 local	 utility	 companies	
(Chermak,	 1998;	 Makholm,	 2012).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 these	 markets	 are	 subject	 to	 competition	
amongst	 commodity	 suppliers	 to	 city	 gates	 and	 not	 amongst	 infrastructure	 (Broadman,	 1986).	
Beukenkamp	 (2009)	 assessed	 pipeline	 competition	 in	 Europe,	 finding	 that	 some	 routes	 across	
Europe	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 compete.	 However,	 these	 are	 long-distance	 routes	 involving	 several	
countries	and	TSOs,	whereas	this	paper	focuses	on	adjacent	markets.	
Von	Hirschhausen	et	al.	 (2007)	analysed	 the	competition	amongst	German	TSOs	and	came	 to	





Germany	 consisting	 of	 16	 market	 areas,	 which	 indicated	 a	 significant	 lower	 degree	 of	 market	





In	 this	 paper,	we	 assess	whether	 transport	 alternatives	 resulting	 from	market	mergers	 could	
allow	 for	 competition	 between	 regulated	 TSOs	 which	 may	 allow	 for	 a	 change	 in	 gas	 market	
regulation.	To	elaborate	on	this,	we	focus	on	the	demand	for	gas	transport	capacities	to	and	from	
the	two	German	gas	markets.	As	Germany	has	been	faced	with	such	a	reduction	 in	the	number	of	
market	 areas	 via	market	mergers,	 inferences	 drawn	 from	 the	German	market	 areas	 contribute	 to	








users.	We	 conclude	 that	 network	 users	make	 efficient	 use	 of	 the	 transport	 alternatives	 obtained	










functioning	of	 European	 gas	markets,	 and	 the	 effect	 of	market	mergers.	 Section	 3	 continues	with	
economic	 theory,	 which	 leads	 to	 our	 hypothesis.	 Section	 4	 introduces	 the	 data	 we	 use,	 whereas	











allows	 for	wholesale	markets,	 so-called	virtual	 trading	points,	 in	 the	market	areas.	 In	an	entry-exit	
system,	 only	 two	 gas	 transport	 capacity	 contracts	 are	 necessary	 to	 supply	 a	 customer.	 A	 capacity	
contract	 at	 an	 entry	 point,	 e.g.	 a	 production	 facility,	 grants	 the	 right	 to	 inject	 gas	 into	 a	 TSO’s	
network.	 Additionally,	 a	 contract	 for	 exit	 capacity	 is	 needed	 at	 the	 point	 where	 gas	 shall	 be	
withdrawn	from	the	network,	e.g.	a	customer	(CEER,	2011;	Lohmann,	2009).	Since	then,	a	network	
user	only	has	to	book	and	manage	entry	and	exit	capacity	contracts	to	transport	gas,	and	no	specific	
routes	 anymore,	 which	 reduces	 transaction	 costs	 (Vazquez	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 A	 supplier	 also	 obtains	
increased	flexibility	as	every	entry	point	can	supply	every	exit	point.	The	management	of	the	physical	
gas	 flows	 is	 solely	 the	 responsibility	of	 TSOs.	Hence,	 commercial	 trading,	based	on	entry	and	exit,	
and	physical	gas	transport	became	decoupled.	In	such	a	market	area,	a	wholesale	market	can	evolve	
as	 the	entry-exit	 system	allows	 to	 virtually	withdraw	gas	 at	 the	 virtual	 trading	point	 to	be	 sold	 to	





to	 its	 quality	 (European	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 2009b).	 Firm	 capacity	 is	
without	any	risk	to	network	users	as	 it	 is	contractually	guaranteed	as	uninterruptible.	Hence,	a	gas	
transport	using	firm	capacity	is	guaranteed	to	take	place.	To	guarantee	the	flow,	the	amount	of	firm	










The	 introduction	 of	 entry-exit	 systems	 induced	 a	 significant	 change,	 and	 a	 major	 step	 towards	
completing	 the	 EU	 internal	 energy	 market	 for	 gas.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 development	 of	 European	
wholesale	 markets	 is	 viewed	 to	 be	 insufficient	 (Frontier	 Economics	 Ltd.,	 2014).	 ACER	 and	 CEER	






such	 as	 tariffs	 (Belassa,	 1961).	 If	 (tariff)	 barriers	 are	 abolished	 completely,	 the	 single	 markets	
become	one,	and	the	law	of	one	price	applies,	which	is	widely	used	in	the	literature	(Li	et	al.,	2014).	
The	possibility	 for	 cross-border	 trade	 and,	 hence,	 also	 the	degree	of	 integration,	 is	 limited	by	 the	
amount	 of	 interconnection	 capacity	 between	 the	 markets	 (Vazquez	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 As	 it	 is	 widely	
discussed	in	the	literature,	the	European	gas	markets	are	already	integrated	to	a	high	extent	(Asche	
et	 al.,	 2013;	 Growitsch	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Kuper	 and	Mulder,	 2016;	 Petrovich,	 2013).	 However,	 further	
integration	 is	 considered	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	well-functioning	 internal	 gas	market	with	
higher	liquidity	and	competition	at	the	wholesale	market,	and	higher	wholesale	price	convergence.	
Therefore,	 the	 regulatory	 authorities	 refer	 to	 three	 potential	market	 integration	 tools	 for	 EU	 gas	
markets	 leading	to	a	different	degree	of	 integration	(ACER	and	CEER,	2015).	One	 instrument	 is	the	
concept	of	a	satellite	market.	This	concept	may	be	applied	where	a	non-functioning	gas	market	can	




are	 characterised	 by	 a	 full	 merger	 of	 the	 wholesale	 markets.	 The	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 is	
whether	or	not	the	balancing	regimes	are	also	merged.		
2.3 Virtual	interconnection	points	





In	 case	 two	 or	 more	 physical	 points	 connect	 two	 market	 areas,	 these	 points	 shall	 be	
commercially	 replaced	 by	 one	 VIP.	 The	 capacity	 that	 was	 offered	 at	 the	 physical	 points	 shall	 be	
offered	at	 the	VIP.	 Thus,	 the	available	 capacity	of	multiple	points	 is	 combined	and	offered	at	one	
point	and	in	one	auction.	Hence,	it	is	no	longer	possible	for	network	users	to	book	capacity	at	one	of	
the	 physical	 points.	 However,	 these	 VIPs	 shall	 only	 be	 implemented	 if	 the	 implementation	 is	 not	








Market	 mergers	 could	 be	 observed	 particularly	 in	 Germany	 (Heather,	 2015;	 Lohmann,	 2009).	
Compared	to	other	EU	Member	States,	which	usually	have	one	or	two	TSOs,	Germany	today	has	16	
TSOs	offering	 gas	 transport	 capacity.5	 In	2006,	Germany	 consisted	of	41	market	 areas,	 but	due	 to	
market	mergers,	 there	 are	 only	 two	market	 areas	 left	 in	Germany	 today,	 named	 “GASPOOL”	 and	
“Net	Connect	Germany	(NCG)”	(Monopolkommission,	2009;	Ströbele	et	al.,	2012).	These	two	market	
areas	shall	be	merged	no	later	than	2022.6	As	Germany	has	been	faced	with	such	a	reduction	in	the	
number	 of	 market	 areas	 via	 market	 mergers,	 inferences	 drawn	 from	 the	 German	 market	 areas	
contribute	to	shaping	the	future	of	the	European	regulatory	regime	and	market	design.		





market	 areas.	 The	 arrows	 indicate	 the	 flow	 direction.	 The	 first	 number	 refers	 to	 the	 number	 of	










do	 not	 have	 the	 right	 to	 interrupt	 the	 gas	 flow,	 although	 this	would	 be	 necessary.	Whilst	market	
mergers	resolve	barriers	to	commodity	trading,	market	mergers	can	impose	restrictions	in	terms	of	
firmness	 and	 free	 allocability	 of	 capacity;	 a	market	merger	may	 cause	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 capacity	
amount	 on	 offer.	 There	 are	 generally	 two	 possibilities	 to	 face	 these	 restrictions	 and	 avoid	 a	
reduction	of	capacity.	Either	invest	into	network	expansions	to	resolve	restrictions,	and	to	guarantee	
the	 firmness	 and	 free	 allocability	 of	 gas	 flows	 given	 the	 new	 flexibility	 for	 network	 users	 and	 the	
resulting	 flow	scenarios,	or	 reflect	 the	 restrictions	 in	 the	design	of	 the	capacity	offered.	The	 latter	
option	may	not	 impact	 the	 total	 amount	of	 firm	 capacity,	 however,	 a	 certain	 amount	 is	 now	 firm	
only	to	certain	conditions	(Wagner	&	Elbling	GmbH,	2014).	
German	TSOs	 chose	 the	 latter	option,	 and	 introduced	additional	 capacity	 types	 reflecting	 the	
restrictions	implied	by	the	merger	taken	place.	All	of	them	are	treated	as	firm	capacity	although	they	
are	firm	only	conditionally.	These	conditions	may	be	linked	to,	for	example,	fluctuations	in	demand	
















(see	 Figure	 2).	 In	 this	 case,	 each	 market	 area	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 physical	
network	 of	 the	 TSOs.	 Each	 TSO	 has	 a	 number	 of	 entry	 and	 exit	 points.	 If,	 for	 example,	 A4	 is	 a	
production	 facility	 and	 A2	 is	 a	 customer	 to	 be	 supplied	 by	 gas	 injected	 at	 the	 point	 A4,	 then	 a	
supplier	 would	 need	 to	 book	 entry	 capacity	 at	 A4	 and	 exit	 capacity	 at	 A2	 as	 the	 market	 area	
implements	an	entry-exit	system.	If	B3	is	another	customer	to	be	supplied	by	gas	from	A4,	then	four	
capacity	 contracts	 are	 needed:	 entry	 at	 A4,	 exit	 at	 A1,	 entry	 at	 B1	 and	 exit	 at	 B3.	 An	 entry-exit	
system	 allows	 only	 combining	 entry	 and	 exit	 points	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 same	market	 area.	 In	 the	
example,	the	customer	is	located	in	a	different	market	area,	which	is	why	two	additional	contracts	at	








gas	 shall	 flow	within	 an	 entry-exit	 system	without	 any	border	 restrictions,	 this	 also	 applies	 to	 the	
merger	 of	 market	 areas	 consisting	 of	 more	 than	 one	 TSO.	 The	merged	market	 area	 is	 no	 longer	
determined	by	one	TSO	network	but	by	two.		
Merging	the	market	areas	A	and	B	creates	opportunities	for	network	users	to	choose	between	
TSO	 A	 and	 TSO	 B	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 connection	 to	 market	 C.	 Assume	 a	 customer	 B3	 shall	 be	
supplied	by	gas	from	C3.	Before	the	merger,	gas	would	have	been	transported	via	the	border	C2/B6	
as	it	can	be	assumed	that	this	route	is	cheaper	than	exporting	the	gas	to	market	area	A,	via	C1/A6,	
and	 exporting	 again	 to	 market	 area	 B,	 via	 A1/B1.	 However,	 after	 the	 merger,	 the	 border	 A1/B1	

















points,	 i.e.	A6	 and	B6	being	connected	 to	C1	 and	C2.	 Implementing	VIPs,	points	C1	 and	C2	will	be	
integrated	 into	a	new	VIP	C1/C2.	 Since	VIP	are	also	 to	be	 implemented	 in	 case	 two	or	more	TSOs	
offer	capacity	on	one	side	of	the	same	border,	capacity	will	no	longer	be	offered	at	the	two	points	




Prior	 to	merging	market	 areas	A,	 B	 and	 C,	 network	 user	 had	 no	 choice	 in	 terms	 of	 booking	
capacity	between	 two	markets	 (Figure	2).	After	 the	markets	A	 and	B	have	been	merged,	network	
users	obtained	a	choice	(Figure	3).	Implementing	VIPs,	the	possibility	to	choose	between	capacity	at	





to	be	made	 in	 line	with	 individual	preferences	based	on	utility	and	profit	maximisation.	 If	 two	 (or	
more)	 capacity	 products	 differ	 in	 any	 of	 the	 characteristics	 they	 are	made	 of,	 network	 users	 are	
supposed	 to	 choose	 the	 alternative	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 preferences.	 Nevertheless,	 capacity	
booking	is	a	means	to	trade	gas	and	therefore,	it	should	allow	for	the	trade	the	network	user	aims	









subjectively	 perceived	 to	 outweigh	 the	 risk.	 Besides	 that,	 however,	 a	 network	 user	may	 prefer	 to	
book	a	more	expensive	alternative	at	a	certain	TSO	 if,	 for	example,	both	companies	belong	 to	 the	
same	 corporate	 group.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 any	 kind	 of	 biased	 behaviour	 of	 vertically	 integrated	
companies,	 unbundling	 obligations	 have	 been	 established	 (Bernaerts,	 2013;	 European	 Parliament	
and	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2009a).	
Besides	costs	for	the	capacity	product,	a	network	user	should	consider	additional	costs	such	as	
those	 related	 to	 the	 booking	 procedure.	 For	 instance,	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 regarding	 available	
capacity	may	cause	information	costs.	In	order	to	book	capacity,	a	network	user	needs	to	be	aware	
of	what	capacity	products	are	on	offer	and	how	these	can	be	booked.	If	more	information	about	a	
specific	 capacity	 product	 is	 provided	 compared	 to	 an	 alternative	 product,	 it	 may	 be	 better	
understood	by	potential	customers	and	thus,	may	be	associated	with	less	risk.	Therefore,	it	may	be	




capacity	 offered.	 This	 sensitivity	 can	 be	 measured	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 difference	 between	 actual	
booking	 and	 optimal	 booking	 behaviour.	 The	 latter	 is	 defined	 as	 behaviour	 that	 results	 in	 lowest	
costs	 for	 booking	 with	 all	 other	 product	 characteristics	 being	 equal.	 This	 allocative	 efficiency	
measure	 is,	 for	 instance,	 used	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 dispatch	 of	 power	 plants:	 given	 a	 variety	 of	
power	plants	using	different	technologies,	an	optimal	dispatch	needs	to	be	determined	to	supply	a	
given	demand	for	electricity	(Müsgens,	2006).	Since	electricity	is	a	homogeneous	good,	the	optimal	
dispatch	 can	 be	 determined	 by	 a	 merit	 order	 of	 the	 unit	 costs	 at	 which	 the	 power	 plants	 offer	
electricity	to	the	market.	The	most	expensive	plant	necessary	to	provide	the	demand	and	in	line	with	
the	merit	order	sets	the	market	price	for	electricity	to	be	obtained	by	all	power	plants.	Hence,	every	







gas	 transport	 capacities.	 Gas	 transport	 capacities	 are	 booked	 via	 auctions	 on	 booking	 platforms.	
Alternatives	 of	 gas	 transport	 capacities	 are	 not	 offered	 in	 joint	 auctions,	 hence,	 there	 is	 no	merit	
order	created	by	the	booking	platform.	However,	network	users	are	able	to	compare	the	prices	for	
standardised	 capacity	 products	 on	 offer,	 and	 create	 merit	 orders	 themselves	 in	 order	 to	 decide	
which	 capacity	 to	book.	As	 compared	 to	 this,	 production	 capacity	 for	electricity	has	a	merit	order	
created	by	a	market	place,	 for	example,	an	electricity	exchange.	However,	the	production	capacity	
for	electricity	may	be	offered	not	only	at	one	market	place	but	also	at	different	market	places.	 In	




auctions.	 If,	 for	 example,	 capacity	 is	 booked	 in	 auction	 C,	 then	 the	 network	 user	 has	 to	 pay	 the	
amount	of	capacity	booked	times	the	tariff	of	 that	particular	auction.	 If	another	network	user	had	





arise	 if	all	networks	users	would	try	to	book	capacity	 in	auction	A.	 If	 in	an	auction	the	demand	for	
capacity	 exceeds	 the	 amount	 on	 offer,	 surcharges	 will	 be	 added	 to	 the	 price	 of	 capacity.	 These	
auction	surcharges	may	cause	a	capacity	allocation	at	a	price	which	is	higher	than	the	price	at	which	
capacity	was	offered	 in	auction	B.	Hence,	 it	would	have	been	more	efficient	 for	a	network	user	to	
directly	book	capacity	at	auction	B.	If	charged,	they	are	included	in	the	actual	costs	of	booking.		
Like	for	electricity,	the	comparison	of	actual	capacity	allocation	to	the	merit	order	determines	














Given	a	European	 regulatory	 framework	with	effective	unbundling	 rules,	harmonised	capacity	
products,	the	entry-exit	system,	and	an	equal	level	of	transparency	and	transaction	costs,	the	price	
of	 capacity	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 the	 driving	 force	 for	 deciding	 between	 transport	 alternatives.	 In	
absence	 of	 restrictions,	 it	 is	 economically	 efficient	 for	 network	 users	 to	 choose	 the	 cheapest	
alternative	available.	Therefore,	we	hypothesise	that	if	network	users	have	the	choice	between	gas	
transport	 alternatives	 for	 one	 and	 the	 same	 market	 area,	 they	 book	 those	 capacities	 that	 are	








We	 use	 auction	 data	 from	 the	 capacity	 booking	 platform	 PRISMA	 for	 the	 calendar	 year	 2016	 to	
determine	the	efficiency	of	network	users’	booking	behaviour.	Gas	transport	capacities	are	offered	
by	TSOs	and	booked	by	network	users.	Capacities	are	offered	on	booking	platforms	and	allocated	via	
auction	procedures	 in	 line	with	European	network	access	provision	stated	 in	the	so-called	network	
code	on	capacity	allocation	mechanisms	(hereafter:	NC	CAM)	(European	Commission,	2017a).	Except	
for	capacity	to	and	from	Poland,	all	auctions	for	primary	capacity	at	German	TSOs	are	auctioned	via	




and	 include,	 amongst	 others,	 entry	 and	 exit	market	 area	 and	network	points,	 entry	 and	 exit	 TSO,	
capacity	on	offer	and	allocated	as	well	as	all	tariffs	and	additional	fees	that	are	charged	to	network	
users	 (PRISMA	 European	 Capacity	 Platform	 GmbH,	 2016).	 The	 NC	 CAM	 rules	 are	 applied	 since	 1	
November	2015.	PRISMA	even	reports	earlier	data.	However,	the	introduction	of	NC	CAM	implied	a	
huge	 change	 to	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 and	 the	 allocation	 procedure.	 Furthermore,	 before	 NC	
CAM	not	all	TSO	offered	capacity	via	PRISMA.	To	ensure	data	consistency,	the	data	set	used	in	the	
































with	 interruptible	 capacity	may	be	 interested	 in	 such	unbundled	 firm	 capacity.	However,	 network	
users	assess	their	demand	for	interruptible	capacity	differently.	Although	relevant	data	are	publicly	
available,	 the	 assessment,	 for	 example	 of	 the	 probability	 of	 interruption,	 and	 the	 resulting	
consequences,	differ	per	network	user.	The	risk	preference	differs	as	well.	As	a	consequence,	only	
firm	 and	 bundled	 capacity	 can	 be	 considered	 for	 the	 analysis,	 as	 unbundled	 and	 interruptible	
capacities	require	additional	data,	which	are	not	available.	Thus,	it	is	not	possible	to	control	for	such	
prerequisites,	 which	 requires	 omitting	 these	 observations	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 a	 distortion	 of	 the	
analysis’	results.	
The	NC	CAM,	as	an	EU	Regulation,	only	applies	to	TSOs	within	the	EU.	However,	such	TSOs	may	
have	 a	 connection	 to	 countries	 outside	 of	 the	 Union	 (non-EU	 countries).	 German	 TSOs	 have	
connections	to	Norway,	Russia,	and	Switzerland.	German	TSOs	offer	such	capacity	also	via	PRISMA	in	





















Within-day	 617,100	 899,590	 1,150	 0.13	
Day-ahead	 27,426	 40,820	 617	 1.51	
Month	 590	 1,094	 35	 3.23	
Quarter	 214	 392	 4	 1.05	
Year	 399	 884	 14	 1.63	
Source:		PRISMA	European	Capacity	Platform	GmbH	(2016);	own	calculations.	
	
The	 longer	 the	 runtime,	 the	 fewer	 auctions	 take	 place.	 This	 seems	 obvious	 as,	 for	 example,	
within	the	runtime	of	a	yearly	capacity	product,	365	(366)	day-ahead	auctions	take	place.	However,	







cover	 all	 auctions	 with	 German	 TSO	 in	 2016.	 A	 network	 user	 may	 hold	 a	 long-term	 contract	
14	
	
concluded	 in	 the	 past,	which	 is	 still	 valid.	 Hence,	 such	 a	 network	 user	 has	 no	 or	 at	 least	 a	 lower	
demand	for	new	capacity.	On	the	other	hand,	the	capacity	products	are	dependent	on	each	other.	








Exit							\							Entry	 GASPOOL	 NCG	 Sum	
internal	borders	
GASPOOL	 -	 73,194	 73,194	
NCG	 56,940	 -	 56,940	
external	borders	
Austria	 -	 20,712	 20,712	
Belgium	/	Luxembourg	 8,679	 25,799	 34,478	
Czech	Republic	 8,787	 36,293	 45,080	
Denmark	 8,711	 8,457	 17,168	
The	Netherlands	 31,698	 77,130	 108,828	
Norway	 22,195	 24,377	 46,572	
Russia	 18,236	 -	 18,236	




Entry							\							Exit	 GASPOOL	 NCG	 Sum	
internal	borders	
GASPOOL	 -	 56,940	 56,940	
NCG	 73,194	 -	 73,194	
external	borders	
Austria	 -	 3,842	 3,842	
Belgium	/	Luxembourg	 8,519	 17,610	 26,129	
Czech	Republic	 19,553	 13,123	 32,676	
Denmark	 12,159	 -	 12,159	
France	 -	 19,690	 19,690	
The	Netherlands	 21,915	 56,807	 78,722	
Switzerland	 -	 26,311	 26,311	
Norway	 8,754	 16,238	 24,992	












Using	the	data	mentioned	above,	we	test	 the	hypothesis	 formulated	 in	Section	3.3	on	the	 level	of	
homogeneous	groups	of	auctions.	As	the	data	set	contains	auctions	which	are	single	observations,	
we	need	 to	group	 these	observations	 in	 such	a	way	 that	any	group	of	observations	 represents	an	
exhaustive	list	of	all	alternatives	a	network	user	with	a	specific	need	for	gas	transport	capacity	could	
have	 chosen	 from.	 This	will	 be	 called	 a	homogeneous	 group	 of	 auctions.	 For	 every	 homogeneous	
group	of	auctions,	we	determine	the	efficiency	of	the	network	users’	booking	behaviour.		













A	 network	 user	 may	 place	 a	 bid	 in	 an	 auction	 offering,	 for	 example,	 a	 monthly	 capacity	
product.	 However,	 he	 may	 also	 book	 day-ahead	 capacity	 on	 every	 day	 of	 the	 month.	 By	
placing	a	bid	 in	an	auction	for	monthly	capacity,	the	network	user	reveals	a	preference	for	
the	 monthly	 product	 over	 a	 month	 of	 day-ahead	 products.	 The	 revealed	 preference	
indicates	 that	 the	network	user	 is	 interested	 in	 buying	 a	monthly	 product	 at	 that	 point	 in	
time.	Hence,	other	capacity	products	may	be	an	alternative	but	are	not	preferred	or	were	
not	auctioned	at	the	time	the	network	users	wanted	to	obtain	capacity.	Thus,	only	capacities	
with	 the	same	runtime	are	considered	alternatives.	This	 implies	 that	 the	analysis	does	not	
measure	cross-product	inefficiency.		
• Start	of	auction:	
As	 stated,	 one	 capacity	 product	 may	 not	 be	 auctioned	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 capacity	 of	




the	 auction	 calendar	 and	 the	 auction	 algorithms	 applied,	 the	 start	 of	 an	 auction	 is	
16	
	
harmonised.	 Only	 if	 the	 start	 of	 auctions	 is	 equal,	 the	 auctions	 can	 be	 alternatives.	 If	 the	
start	 of	 auctions	 is	 not	 equal,	 they	 can	never	be	 alternatives	 as	 the	network	users	 do	not	
have	the	ability	to	choose	amongst	those.	
• Runtime	start:	
The	 capacity	 product	 and	 the	 start	 of	 the	 auction	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 cover	 the	 time	
dimension.	According	 to	 the	auction	 calendar,	 there	are	 two	different	within-day	auctions	
taking	 place	 at	 7:00	 p.m.	 each	 day:	 Firstly,	within-day	 capacity	 is	 offered	 for	 the	 next	 gas	
day.11	 It	 has	 the	 same	 runtime	 as	 a	 day-ahead	 product,	 i.e.	 one	 gas	 day	 of	 24	 hours.	 As	
within-day	capacity	is	sold	after	day-ahead	capacity,	the	amount	offered	is	the	non-allocated	
amount	of	firm	day-ahead	capacity.	The	runtime	of	this	capacity	starts	at	the	next	gas	day,	
i.e.	 6:00	 a.m.	 Secondly,	 within-day	 capacity	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 current	 gas	 day	 is	 also	
auctioned	at	7:00	p.m.	The	runtime	of	 this	capacity	starts	 four	hours	after	 the	start	of	 the	
respective	auctions	and	ends	at	the	end	of	the	same	gas	day	(European	Commission,	2017a).	
This	 underlines	 that	within-day	 capacity	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 “rest-of-the-day”	 capacity.	 Since	 these	




range.	 A	 capacity	 product	 in	 Germany	may	 be	 either	 H-gas	 (high)	 or	 L-gas	 (low)	 capacity.	
Since	a	H-gas	 (L-gas)	 capacity	 refers	only	 to	 transport	high	 (low)	calorific	gas,	H-	and	L-gas	
capacity	are	no	substitutes	and,	hence,	they	are	no	alternatives	for	network	users.	
	
























In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 every	 homogeneous	 group	 of	 auctions	 is	
determined.	For	 this	purpose,	an	 indicator	 IER	 is	calculated.	By	 this	 inefficiency	 ratio,	we	compare	







IER	 is	 calculated	 for	 each	 homogeneous	 group	 of	 auctions.	 To	 interpret	 and	 compare	 the	
results,	and	draw	conclusions	from	the	results,	a	weighted	IER	for	a	cluster	of	homogeneous	groups	
can	be	used.	 Such	a	 cluster	may	 consist	of,	 for	 example,	 all	 homogeneous	groups	 connecting	 two	
specific	 market	 areas,	 and	 its	 IER	 may	 be	 compared	 with	 those	 of	 another	 connection.	 For	 this	
purpose,	a	weighted	IER	may	be	used.	This	is	calculated	as	a	weighted	average	of	all	the	individual	
IER	of	the	relevant	homogeneous	groups.	As	a	weight,	we	use	the	runtime	of	the	capacity	product	
normalised	 to	 days	 [d]	 as	well	 as	 the	 capacity	 allocated	 in	 kWh/h/runtime	 of	 each	 homogeneous	
group	[i]	as	expressed	by	Equation	3.	
IER	weighted=	
	(IERi × runtimei × allocated capacityi)ni=1




is	 based	 on	 regulated	 network	 tariffs.	 In	 case	 of	 contractual	 congestions,	 an	 auction	 premium	 is	
added.	 Furthermore,	 additional	 charges	 or	 fees	 are	 considered	 if	 applied	 by	 the	 respective	 TSO.	
These	may	be	charged,	for	example,	for	metering	services,	billing	services,	or	gas	quality	conversion.	
All	the	costs	may	be	charged	in	different	units.	In	order	to	compare,	all	components	are	harmonised	
to	 cent/kWh/h/runtime.	 In	 case	 charges	 are	 not	 provided	 in	 Euros,	 daily	 exchange	 rates	 of	 the	
European	 Central	 Bank	 are	 used	 to	 convert	 to	 Euros.	 After	 calculating	 the	 total	 price	 per	 unit	 of	
capacity	 for	 all	 auctions,	 we	 create	 a	 merit	 order	 for	 every	 homogeneous	 group	 by	 ranking	 all	
contained	 auctions	 by	 the	 total	 price	 per	 unit	 of	 capacity.	 The	 optimal	 costs	 of	 booking	 are	
determined	 for	 every	 homogeneous	 group	 of	 auctions	 pricing	 the	 total	 capacity	 allocation	 of	 all	
auctions	 of	 a	 homogeneous	 group	 according	 to	 the	merit	 order.	 The	 actual	 costs	 of	 booking	 are	
determined	for	every	homogeneous	group	by	sum	of	the	price	of	a	single	unit	of	capacity	multiplied	
by	the	amount	of	capacity	allocated	of	all	auctions	belonging	to	the	same	homogeneous	group.	An	







The	 conditions	 of	 a	mandatory	 capacity	 allocation	 and	 the	minimum	 size	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 large	
impact	 on	 the	 number	 of	 homogenous	 groups	 of	 auctions.	 According	 to	 Table	 5,	 645,729	





















































Within-day	 617,100	 251,293	 5,260	 1,528	 0.85	 0.61	
Day-ahead	 27,426	 10,955	 1,374	 1,374	 5.01	 12.54	
Month	 590	 287	 216	 70	 36.61	 24.39	
Quarter	 214	 100	 32	 14	 14.95	 14.00	
Year	 399	 246	 47	 17	 11.78	 6.91	
Sum	 645,729	 262,881	 6,929	 3,003	 1.07	 1.14	






Table	7.	The	number	of	auctions	 is	obtained	by	multiplying	 the	size	of	groups	with	 the	number	of	
homogeneous	groups.	As	already	stated,	groups	consisting	of	only	one	auction	are	to	be	omitted	as	
they	 do	 not	 offer	 a	 choice	 to	 network	 users.	 If	 omitted,	 about	 74%	 of	 all	 homogeneous	 groups	
consist	of	 two	 (approximately	40%)	or	 three	 (approximately	33%)	single	auctions.	Omitting	groups	
consisting	of	one	auction,	and	applying	the	condition	of	a	successful	capacity	allocation,	about	30%	















1	 93,546	 92,625	 921	
2	 68,272	 67,374	 898	
3	 56,367	 54,790	 1,577	
4	 13,268	 13,228	 40	
5	 7,963	 7,797	 166	
6	 11,591	 11,381	 210	
7	 10,887	 10,783	 104	
8	 987	 979	 8	







ratios	 calculated	 and	 derive	 the	 weighted	 IER	 using	 the	 runtimes	 and	 capacity	 allocated	 as	 the	
weights.13	 Table	 8	 summarises	 the	 results	 of	 the	 efficiency	 calculation;	 more	 detailed	 results	 are	
provided	in	the	appendix.	According	to	these,	GASPOOL	capacity	is	booked	less	efficiently	compared	
to	NCG	capacity.	However,	about	three	quarters	of	the	 loss	 in	consumer	welfare	 is	caused	by	NCG	
capacity.	 Although	 there	 may	 be	 restrictions	 regarding	 booking	 capacity	 to	 and	 from	 non-EU	
countries,14	those	capacities	are	booked	more	efficiently	(1.05)	compared	to	connection	to	and	from	























After	 having	 calculated	 the	 inefficiencies	 of	 network	 users’	 booking	 behaviour,	we	 examine	 these	
inefficiencies.	 As	 elaborated	 in	 Section	 4,	 the	 analysis	 takes	 into	 account	 only	 firm	 capacity.	With	
reference	 to	 the	European	regulatory	 framework,	 it	has	been	assumed	that	gas	 transport	capacity	
offered	 by	 the	 TSOs	 is	 harmonised	 such	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 capacity	 is	 always	 either	 firm	 or	




TSO	 in	 the	 course	 of	 market	 mergers.15	 These	 conditions	 imply	 a	 risk,	 which	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	
networks	 tariffs	 by	 granting	 a	 discount	 (Bundesnetzagentur,	 2015).	 Multiple	 firm	 capacity	 types	










measured	 initially,	 we	 hypothesise	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 capacity	 product,	 i.e.	 the	 capacity	 type,	
matters	to	network	users,	and	has	an	impact	on	their	booking	behaviour.	This	hypothesis	refers	to	
the	fact	that,	for	example,	a	capacity	that	is	always	firm,	having	no	conditionality,	and	a	capacity	that	
is	 firm	only	 in	accordance	with	a	certain	demand	are	of	a	different	quality,	and,	 therefore,	are	no	
complete	substitutes.	Hence,	a	network	user	who	might	be	completely	risk	averse	may	never	book	
conditional	firm	capacity	even	in	case	it	is	offered	at	a	lower	price	compared	to	non-conditional	firm.	
This	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 homogeneous	 group	 of	 auctions.	 If	 the	 capacity	 type	
matters,	then	the	analysis	needs	to	control	not	only	for	firm	and	interruptible	capacity	but	also	for	
different	 firm	capacity	 types.	Thus,	 the	definition	of	homogeneous	groups	will	be	extended	by	 the	
type	of	firm	for	both	entry	and	exit	capacity	of	a	firm	bundled	capacity	product.	
Since	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 homogeneous	 group	 has	 become	 stricter,	 the	 number	 of	 groups	
increases.	Table	9	 is	based	on	Table	5,	and	compares	 the	number	of	homogeneous	groups	 for	 the	
two	different	definitions	of	firm	capacity.	The	stricter	definition	leads	to	an	increase	from	262,881	to	
448,822	groups,	as	a	stricter	definition	requires	auctions	to	have	more	equal	characteristics	in	order	
to	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 group.	 However,	 the	 number	 of	 groups	 with	 at	 least	 two	 single	 auctions	





































1.01,	 falling	 from	 1.05.	 Even	 though	 there	may	 be	 additional	 restrictions	 influencing	 the	 booking	
behaviour	at	the	border	with	non-EU	countries,	also	these	connections	show	a	weighted	IER	of	1.01.	
Overall,	 the	 inefficiency	 measured	 is	 at	 about	 1%.	 In	 monetary	 terms,	 approximately	 93%	 of	 all	
inefficiencies	can	be	explained	by	controlling	 for	different	 firm	capacity	 types	as	used	 in	Germany.	
However,	 the	 loss	 in	 consumer	 welfare	 explained	 by	 the	 different	 definition	 of	 firm	 capacity	 for	
GASPOOL	 exit	 is,	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 clusters	 of	 connections,	 relatively	 low	 (about	 11.6%).	
Comparing	the	inefficiency	initially	calculated	in	absolute	monetary	terms	of	GASPOOL	exit	with,	for	
example,	 NCG	 exit,	 NCG	 exit	 shows	 a	 loss	 in	 consumer	 welfare	 of	 about	 19	 times	 the	 loss	 of	
GASPOOL	 exit.	 Applying	 the	 German	 definition	 of	 firm	 capacity,	 the	 loss	 in	 consumer	 welfare	 of	
GASPOOL	exit	is	only	about	0.76	times	the	loss	of	NCG	exit.	Hence,	looking	at	the	absolute	numbers	
reveal	 that	 the	 inefficiency	 initially	 determined	 has	 already	 been	 relatively	 low	 for	GASPOOL	 exit,	











markets	 may	 lead	 to	 competition	 between	 transmission	 system	 operators	 within	 the	 merged	
markets.	One	condition	for	competition	to	emerge	is	that	network	users	make	efficient	choices,	i.e.	
that	 they	 choose	 those	 network	 connections	 with	 the	 lowest	 network	 tariffs.	 To	 analyse	 the	
efficiency	of	booking	behaviour	of	cross-border	gas	capacity,	one	needs	to	control	for	differences	in	
the	European	and	national	regulations	in	terms	of	capacity	types.		
Analysing	 the	booking	behaviour	of	network	users	 in	 the	German	gas	markets	over	2016,	we	
find	an	inefficiency	of	approximately	6%	when	we	only	include	one	type	of	firm	capacity	as	defined	
by	 European	 regulation.	 Most	 of	 these	 inefficiencies,	 however,	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 taking	 into	
account	different	types	of	firm	capacity,	which	actually	exist	in	Germany.	The	remaining	inefficiency	
is	 about	 1%.	 Thus,	 we	 conclude	 that	 network	 users	 are	 sensitive	 to	 differences	 in	 gas	 transport	
capacity	offered	by	TSOs,	 and	 that	 their	booking	behaviour	 is	 to	 a	 very	 large	extent	efficient.	Our	
analysis	underlines	 that	network	users	are	not	only	 sensitive	 to	differences	 in	network	 tariffs,	 but	
that	differences	 in	 terms	of	 the	quality	of	 capacity	products	 also	matter	 to	network	users	making	
their	booking	decisions.	
Our	analysis	differs	from	previous	studies	on	market	integration	(e.g.	Asche	et	al.,	2013;	Kuper	
and	 Mulder,	 2016;	 Petrovich,	 2013)	 as	 it	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 degree	 of	 wholesale	 market	
integration,	 but	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 gas	 market	 mergers	 on	 the	 competition	 among	 infrastructure	
operators.	 As	we	 find	 that	 network	 users	make	 efficient	 use	 of	 the	 booking	 alternatives	 that	 are	




paper	we	did	not	analyse	how	TSOs	 set	 the	 tariffs	 for	 access	 to	 their	networks.	 This	behaviour	of	
TSOs	depends	on	the	regulatory	framework	they	are	operating	in.	Therefore,	before	any	conclusion	
on	 the	 potential	 of	 competition	 among	 TSOs	 within	 merged	 market	 areas	 can	 be	 drawn,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 study	 such	 a	 behaviour	 taking	 into	 account	 constraints	 given	 by	 the	 regulatory	
framework.	
	The	 results	 of	 this	 analysis	 may	 be	 relevant	 for	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 European	 regulatory	
framework,	which	is,	amongst	others,	directed	at	harmonisation	within	the	EU	(European	Parliament	
and	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 2009b).	 One	 of	 these	 topics,	 for	 example,	 is	 the	 provision	
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